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Abstract. Pervasive computing, driven by faster, cheaper and smaller
devices, and wireless networking technology, promises to make people
perpetual users of a massive and decentralized computational system.
Pervasive computing blurs the boundary between the physical and the
virtual. Information, always cheap to duplicate, now becomes cheap to
generate everywhere. At once both the opportunities, such as for data
mining and collaborative ltering, and the dangers, such as for privacy
abuse, are clear. As a challenge to the agent community this paper
proposes the development of agent-mediated, decentralized information-
processing mechanisms, that enshrine the principles of information prop-
erty rights and provides economic incentives to support ecient informa-
tion sharing. We discuss the complementary roles of markets, information-
degradation and aggregation, and reputation, within such a mechanism,
and propose a straw-man model.
1 Introduction
We are at the frontier of a world of pervasive computing, with fast, cheap,
and small computational devices everywhere. Devices are embedded in buildings
and physical infrastructure [17,13], mobile devices continue to get smaller and
more powerful, and ad hoc wireless networks continue to emerge. As pervasive
computing blurs the boundary between the physical and the virtual, we become
perpetual users of a massive and decentralized computational system.
It will soon be possible to collect information, for example about the location
and activities of individuals everywhere, and infer contextual information about
actions and current goals. As an example, maybe I walk into a store and the
store can dynamically negotiate a price on a particular good or service based on
information that I have recently spent a long time comparison shopping online.1
1 We already hear of cases where cell phone locations have been used to solve crime,
and there is a hot debate about the privacy implications of the practice of track-
ing cell phone locations. The Electronic Privacy Information Privacy Center (EPIC)
maintains an archive of news articles debating privacy and wiretaps on digital com-
munication technology. http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/2
Electronic commerce web sites already collect information about our on-line
purchases and browsing habits, to use for personalization and service dieren-
tiation, and also to aggregate information with other sites and perhaps sell to
third parties. Consider now the opportunities for the personalization of activities
and services in the physical world that can be enabled by pervasive information
gathering and pervasive information processing. Of course, at the same time the
dangers, for example of privacy abuse, are clear [3].
As a challenge to the agent community, we propose the development of a
well-functioning agent-based infrastructure for decentralized information mecha-
nisms. We dene a well-functioning information mechanism as a system in which
autonomous computational agents, representing self-interested users, make de-
cisions about information revelation and information sharing that are benecial
from the perspective of the system as a whole. For example, if my agent knows
a good place for the user of another agent to go and buy the book that she is
looking for, then we would like that information to be exchanged between agents
(perhaps for a price).
It is proposed that well-functioning information mechanisms will require: (1)
information property rights and markets to reward users for the fair value of
information; (2) control of information release, via pseudonymity, data degra-
dation, and information aggregation; and (3) reputation mechanisms to address
asymmetries that exist during negotiation for information. Computationally, the
challenge is to build decentralized information processing systems that can han-
dle the ability for massive and distributed data acquisition and processing. We
will describe a straw-man model for the components of a decentralized agent-
mediated solution.
2 Some Design Principles of Information Mechanisms
The intention of this section is to lay out the three components, or principles,
for the design of decentralized information mechanisms.
2.1 Information Property Rights and Markets
The rst principle is to provide users with property rights over information, to
allow users to control when and how information is shared and used, and to
provide markets to allow them to extract surplus from the value of their infor-
mation. With property rights, there is in fact no fundamental conict between
the right to privacy and the ability to leverage the value of shared information.
Rather, an economic view of privacy holds that users should receive a fair price
for the use of personal data (this price can be set arbitrarily high by a user that
requires absolute privacy) [18,11,3].
Earlier work has suggested markets for information-sharing, for example
\markers for evaluations" [4] and \markets for secrets" [3]. From a mechanism
design perspective [9], we can also imagine the formulation of a simple infor-
mation sharing game. Consider a system of agents, each with private informa-
tion, and another agent with a query to execute. Mechanism design supposes3
that agents will follow game-theoretically rational strategies, and choose to re-
veal information and formulate queries to maximize their own expected payo
in equilibrium, given beliefs about the strategies of other agents. It will be an
interesting exercise in mechanism design to formulate an incentive-compatible
mechanism for information sharing, in which truth-revelation is an equilibrium
strategy. One direction is to provide an expressive bidding language, in which
agents can express valuations for the accuracy of query responses, and costs for
the accuracy of information revelation.
A well-functioning mechanism would select a social-welfare maximizing level
of information revelation, for example selecting the accuracy of the response to
a query to maximize the dierence between the value of the query response and
the cost in terms of information revelation.
2.2 Control of Information Revelation
As a second principle, a well-functioning information mechanism should provide
a number of tools to give users control over the sharing and release of information.
We assume that once information is revealed to any agent (even implicitly via
the response to queries), then the ability to extract additional surplus from that
information is lost, because the marginal cost of duplication of information to the
receiving agent is assumed to be zero. Information is very easy to duplicate and
disseminate, via powerful content distribution networks can be constructed on
top of the existing Internet infrastructure [2]. The challenge, then, is to provide
responses to queries without revealing too much information. For example, it is
better to respond \yes, you'll like that book", than \yes, you'll like that book
because of all the information that I have, and here it is."
One control tool is the ability for users to adopt pseudonyms, and multiple
identities. This prevents the aggregation of information across multiple queries
(\tell me the rst letter of your street address, then the next letter, then the next
letter, etc.") Another control tool is aggregation, in which queries are evaluated
on the basis of summary information from multiple (probably similar) users.
Data mining methods, such as collaborative ltering and reputation mechanisms,
allow useful knowledge about user populations to be mined from sparse data
about the preferences and actions of a population of users [16,14].
Even aggregated and anonymized query responses can leak information if an
adversary knows some information about the users and can reverse-engineer the
identity of the user associated with a response [3]. As such, another control tool
is provided by the ability to perform statistical query-ltering, for example to
check the sensitivity of the response to a query to the information content in
any one user's data. Automatic information degradation, via coarse-level data
clustering (e.g. the \binning" of data into crude data bins) and the injection of
noise (e.g. the addition of random perturbations to data) are intriguing methods
to address this problem. Similarly, boot-strapping methods, in which queries
are queued up until enough there is enough data in aggregate across a number
of agents to allow individual users to hide behind other users and allow query
responses without undesirable information leakage.4
2.3 Reputation Mechanisms
Finally, an information mechanism will need to provide methods to address the
information asymmetries that exist between buyers and sellers in negotiation
about information. The seller knows the quality of the information, but a seller
with high quality information needs a way to demonstrate the quality a prospec-
tive buyer, and avoid spiraling towards Akerlof's \Market for lemons" [1], where
only low-quality information survives.
This problem is often addressed with branding; for example, the New York
Times would not survive if any newspaper could pretend to be the Times, or if
the Times had no recognizable identity [19]. Free samples are another way to
handle this problem, for example as delivered by listening stands in music stores.
Branding is not useful in ad hoc and large scale decentralized mechanisms, and
in particular with pseudonymous and anonymous identities.
Reputation mechanisms [15,6] can provide a similar eect to branding in
highly dynamic and highly distributed multi-agent systems. A reputation mech-
anism provides a trusted method to aggregate and track feedback from partici-
pants in transactions, creating a shadow of the future [5]. The ability to adopt
pseudonymous and anonymous identities can itself reduce the eciency repu-
tation mechanisms; for example, one eect is that the default reputation for a
newcomer to a system must be low reputation [8]. There can be other problems,
arising from the ability to trade reputations (for example via identity swapping),
and the ability to form collusive rings to articially inate reputations [7].
A reputation mechanism for an information market would also need to rely
on accurate reports of the quality of a transaction because it is unlikely that there
will be an objective measure of quality. Methods to promote truthful reporting
include checking for outliers [4], and also using proper scoring rules and payments
to implement truthful reporting in equilibrium [12].
3 Information Clusters and a Market for Queries
We imagine a dynamic \agent soup", with autonomous and self-interested agents
associated with user information able to form ad hoc coalitions, that compete
with other information clusters to provide responses to queries. A similar vi-
sion, of information crystals, was recently outlined in Adar & Huberman [3]. A
well-functioning information mechanism would provide incentives for the emer-
gence of information clusters of the right size and content: making a tradeo
between the higher computational eciency (from less coordination costs) of
smaller clusters and the higher informational value and better privacy proper-
ties (via aggregation) of larger clusters.
As a straw-man model, we propose the following basic components for an
information mechanism:
property rights/market Users can control the release of information through
multiple information agents, each of which chooses to join an information
cluster. The user can decide what subset of information to provide to each5
information agent (and can provide the same information to multiple agents).
Information agents can participate within clusters, to respond to queries as
appropriate to maximize the payo to the user, making appropriate tradeos
between information revelation and payments. Information clusters compete
in a market for queries, in response to queries that specify values for dierent
accuracy-levels in responses. Clusters share collected payments across the
information agents within a cluster.
control Each information agent controls the level with which data is aggregated
and shared with other agents in a cluster in order to respond to queries, and
is free to adopt a pseudonymous identity. In responding to queries, clusters
aggregate input information from each agent in the cluster, and select the
appropriate level of accuracy to quote in response to query request. Agent
clusters can also support boot-strapping, in which queries are queued at an
information cluster until the cluster gets large enough to respond to queries
without compromising privacy.
reputation A reputation-web maintains reputation, with agents able to rate
the information provided by a cluster of agents and evaluations weighted by
the individual reputation of reporting agents. The reputations of individual
agents within a cluster are adjusted based on the reported evaluations, and
the reputation of a cluster depends in turn on an aggregation of agent reputa-
tions within the cluster. Incentive-based schemes can be incorporated within
the reputation mechanism to promote truthful rating about the quality of
responses to queries.
Looking forward, it will be interesting to understand the extent to which
the roles of reputation mechanisms and incentive mechanisms orthogonal. Tra-
ditional price-based mechanism design focuses on one-shot interactions, while
tending to ignore long-term strategic interactions. On the other hand, reputa-
tion mechanisms focus on repeated interactions, but perhaps lack the delity
to implement optimal equilibrium behavior at any single point in time. Kalai
& Ledyard [10] previously demonstrated that repeated implementation is more
powerful than one-shot implementation, but no theory that combines reputation
mechanism methodologies with one-shot mechanism design methodologies has
yet been developed.
4 Conclusion
We propose the design of decentralized information-processing mechanisms as
an important challenge problem for the agent research community. The problem
is proposed as a response to the rapid emergence of pervasive computing and
pervasive information acquisition. We imagine that these information mecha-
nisms will provide incentives for the emergence of ad hoc information clusters,
in which agents collaborate to combine user information within clusters, and
clusters compete to respond to queries.6
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